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It’s	a	common	observation	that	Blade	Runner	inspires	us	to	reflect	on	what	it	means	to	be	
human.	The	principal	cause	for	such	reflection	is,	of	course,	the	cast	of	replicants	–	the	
bioengineered	humanoid	creatures	originally	produced	by	the	Tyrell	Corporation	to	work	on	
off-world	colonies.	As	the	opening,	scene-setting	text	famously	informs	us,	following	a	
bloody	off-world	mutiny	by	a	group	of	Nexus	6	replicants,	the	creatures	are	declared	illegal	
on	Earth	and	are	hunted	down	and	terminated	(‘retired’)	by	special	police	known	as	blade	
runners.	Against	this	backdrop,	the	replicants	repeatedly	engage	our	thoughts	and	emotions	
by	blurring	the	distinction	between	the	human	and	the	non-human.	Confronted	by	an	event	
such	as	Rachael’s	distressed	reaction	when	Deckard	exposes	the	truth	about	her	‘memories’	
or	Roy’s	poetic	dying	speech,	we	ask	ourselves	one	of	those	stubborn	and	demanding	
existential	questions:	‘what	does	it	mean	to	be	human?’.	Unsurprisingly,	this	is	a	question	
that	philosophers	through	the	ages	have	tried	to	answer,	and	one	historically	influential	
response	comes	from	the	controversial	German	thinker,	Martin	Heidegger,	most	notably	in	
the	pages	of	his	ground-breaking	1927	text,	Being	and	Time.	Of	course,	Heidegger	didn’t	
know	anything	about	replicants.	Nevertheless,	as	I	hope	to	show,	we	can	use	his	ideas	to	
see	the	blurring	of	the	human	and	the	non-human	in	Blade	Runner	in	a	new	and	productive	
light.		
	
In	thinking	about	the	nature	of	replicant	existence,	it	might	seem	that	the	place	to	start	is	
with	physical	or	biological	constitution.	For	although	replicants	are,	as	the	film’s	preamble	
tells	us,	the	result	of	‘advanced	robot	evolution’,	they	are,	for	the	most	part	at	least,	organic	
creatures,	just	like	us.	It’s	true	that	the	biological	body	parts	of	individual	replicants	are	
standardly	genetically	engineered	separately	and	only	later	assembled	into	a	whole.	(At	one	
point,	we	meet	Hannibal	Chew,	an	employee	of	the	Tyrell	Corporation	whose	job	is	to	
genetically	engineer	replicant	eyes.)	But,	in	Blade	Runner	2049	(if	you	haven’t	seen	the	
sequel	–	spoiler	alert),	even	that	difference	in	origin	stories	is	left	behind.	It	turns	out	that	
Rachael,	a	prototype	Nexus	7	replicant,	was	deliberately	engineered	so	as	to	be	able	to	
become	pregnant	and	indeed	went	on	to	have	a	child	with	the	blade	runner	Deckard.	
Bearing	in	mind	the	ongoing	debate	over	whether	Deckard	is	replicant	or	human,	that	child	
is,	from	an	origin	angle,	either	a	reproductively	generated	replicant	or	a	reproductively	
generated	replicant-human	hybrid.	Either	way,	this	is	the	(current)	end	point	of	a	trajectory	
in	which	the	sorts	of	differences	between	replicants	and	human	beings	that	one	might	pick	
out	from	a	physical	or	biological	perspective	are	shown	to	be	negotiable	and	subject	to	
erosion.		
	
As	it	happens,	Heidegger	wouldn’t	have	been	very	interested	in	the	points	just	made,	
because	he	thought	that	if	one’s	goal	is	to	understand	the	character	of	human	existence,	it’s	
no	good	rummaging	around	in	physical	or	biological	facts.	Rather,	one	needs	to	provide	a	
disciplined	philosophical	interpretation	of	the	distinctive	way	of	existing,	or	being,	that	
human	beings	as	such	realize.	Heidegger	had	a	term	for	this	distinctive	kind	of	being;	he	
called	it	Dasein	(a	German	term	translated	literally	as	‘there-being’).	So	what	is	Dasein?	If	
we	look	around	at	beings	in	general	–	from	particles	to	planets,	ants	to	apes	–	it	is	human	
beings	alone	(Heidegger	thought)	who	are	able	to	encounter	the	question	of	what	it	means	
to	be,	and	it’s	that	encounter	with	the	meaning	of	existence	(more	on	which	below)	which	is	
the	mark	of	Dasein.	Now,	although	Heidegger	himself	believed	that,	as	a	matter	of	fact,	only	
human	beings	have	the	way	of	being	of	Dasein,	he	certainly	didn’t	rule	out	the	possibility	
that	other	beings	could,	in	principle,	make	the	grade.	So,	in	the	present	context,	we	might	
wonder	whether	replicants	qualify.	Can	replicants,	like	human	beings,	encounter	the	
question	of	the	meaning	of	being?	In	other	words,	are	replicants	Dasein?	Answering	this	
question	will	give	us	an	insight	into	the	blurring	of	the	human	and	the	non-human	in	Blade	
Runner.		
	
Let’s	remind	ourselves	of	a	few	facts	about	replicants.	These	will	be	important	in	what	
follows.	The	Nexus	series	of	replicants	are	designed	to	be	stronger,	more	agile	and	more	
intelligent	than	human	beings,	but	are	not	endowed	with	our	emotions,	which	is	why	
spotting	a	replicant	involves	a	test	that	targets	non-verbal	emotional	responses.	However,	
by	the	time	we	reach	the	Nexus	6	series,	the	designers	have	become	concerned	that	the	
replicants	will	develop	certain	emotional	responses	through	experience	and	so	will	be	
immune	to	the	test.	To	head	off	this	situation,	Nexus	6	replicants	are	given	a	strict	four-year	
lifespan.	Moreover,	to	prevent	the	replicants’	newly	developed	emotions	from	making	them	
unstable,	a	practice	begins	of	implanting	the	creatures	with	false	memories	that	are	
designed	to	provide,	as	Eldon	Tyrell	puts	it,	‘a	cushion	or	pillow	for	their	emotions’.	This	
practice	is	brought	to	the	fore	in	the	case	of	Rachael,	the	prototype	Nexus	7	replicant	
mentioned	previously,	who,	unbeknownst	to	her,	has	been	given	a	set	of	‘memories’	copied	
from	Tyrell's	niece.		
	
How	do	these	characteristics	of	replicant	being	bear	on	whether	the	creatures	are	Dasein?	
Here	we	need	to	pause	to	identify	the	underlying	structures	that	explain	why	Dasein,	as	a	
way	of	existing,	has	the	precise	character	that	it	does.	This	is	the	principal	task	of	Being	and	
Time,	and	it	has	to	be	said	that	it’s	a	very	long	book.	So	here	I’ll	make	do	with	just	two	key	
phenomena	that	Heidegger	discusses,	namely	heritage	and	death.	Let’s	start	with	heritage.		
	
As	I	grew	up,	I	was	inducted	into	a	particular	culture	and	thereby	into	certain	pre-
established	ways	of	making	sense	of	things.	Thus	the	current	significance	of	my	laptop	
comes	from	its	role	as	an	entity	with	which	I	am	working	in	the	practical	context	of	my	
study,	in	order	to	write	an	article	on	Blade	Runner.	That	activity	is	being	carried	out	for	the	
sake	of	my	being	a	philosopher,	that	is,	for	the	sake	of	a	particular	way	in	which	I	make	
sense	of	myself	in	my	culture.	And	that	way	of	being	points	to	other	culturally	conditioned	
aspects	of	my	existence,	such	as	being	a	professional	academic,	a	job	that	I	do,	in	part,	for	
the	sake	of	my	being	a	care	giver.	The	precise	networks	of	significance	in	which	things	make	
sense	will	vary	from	culture	to	culture.	What	is	shared,	however,	is	the	fact	that	every	
individual	with	the	way	of	being	of	Dasein	will	experience	life	as	an	unfolding	series	of	
situations	in	which	she	finds	things	mattering	to	her	in	relation	to	some	set	of	pre-
established,	culturally	conditioned	patterns	of	meaning.	One	can	think	of	all	this	as	the	way	
in	which	a	creature	with	the	way	of	being	of	Dasein	collects	up	its	past,	where	‘past’	refers	
ultimately	to	the	cultural	history	of	one’s	group.	For	Heidegger,	this	is	what	it	means	to	say	
that	Dasein	has	a	heritage.		
	
Now	recall	the	rupture	that	Rachael	experiences,	when	she	learns	from	Deckard	that	she	is	a	
replicant,	one	whose	implanted	early-life	‘memories’	have	been	copied	from	the	
experiences	of	a	human	being.	One	cannot	do	justice	to	the	severity	of	this	rupture	merely	
by	observing	that	Rachael	has	discovered	that	she	possesses	a	large	number	of	false	
memories.	Rather,	in	Heideggerian	terms,	her	realization	is	that	she	has	no	heritage.	The	
world	of	meaning	in	which	Rachael	has	apparently	been	largely	at	home	–	the	world	that	so	
far	has	determined	how	things	matter	to	her	–	is	now	a	strange	and	alien	place	in	which	she	
is	not	at	home,	and	indeed	into	which	she	has	never	been	genuinely	inducted.	This	
realization	is	traumatic,	of	course,	but	it	also	marks	the	beginning	of	a	positive	transition	in	
Rachael’s	self-understanding.	To	articulate	that	transition,	we	need	to	understand	how	
Heidegger	thinks	about	the	phenomenon	of	death.			
	
Heidegger	points	out	that,	among	all	the	genuine	possibilities	that	confront	me	in	life,	the	
possibility	of	my	own	death	is	peculiar	in	that,	from	the	perspective	of	my	experience,	it	
must	remain	only	a	possibility.	After	all,	once	my	death	becomes	actual,	I	am	no	longer.	
Crucially,	for	Heidegger,	when	I	confront	death	in	this	way,	my	own	existence	as	a	human	
being	is	brought	into	proper	view.	So,	being	aware	of	my	death	as	a	possibility	is	one	way	in	
which	I	encounter	the	Dasein-defining	question	of	what	it	means	to	be.	Death	here	is	best	
characterized	as	the	possibility	of	a	world	without	me	(the	possibility	of	my	not	being	in	the	
world).	And	this	possibility	may	be	revealed	to	Dasein	through	a	particular	kind	of	anxiety,	
one	that	is	not	directed	towards	some	specific	object	or	event	(e.g.	being	anxious	about	an	
exam),	but	which	occurs	as	a	state	of	mind	in	which	I	no	longer	feel	at	home	in	the	world,	in	
which	the	world	is	unintelligible.	Thus,	in	experiencing	a	world	from	which	I	am,	in	a	sense,	
absent,	the	possibility	of	a	world	without	me	(in	which	I	do	not	exist)	is	revealed	to	me.	Call	
this	a	state	of	existential	anxiety.	Rachael’s	state,	when	Deckard	reveals	the	truth	about	her,	
is	just	such	a	state,	as	indicated	by	the	fact	that	Rachael’s	replicant	emotions	are	no	longer	
cushioned	by	the	implanted	‘memories’	that	helped	give	her	an	illusory	heritage.		
	
Now,	here’s	the	crucial	point.	Heidegger	claims	that	existential	anxiety	is	a	route	to	what	he	
calls	authenticity.	‘Authentic’	here	does	not	mean	genuine	as	opposed	to	fake.	It	means	
owned	by	me,	in	roughly	the	way	that	I	might	own	(take	forward	as	mine)	a	decision	made	
by	a	committee	on	which	I	have	sat.	Ownership	here	also	means	to	take	control	of,	in	the	
way	that	I	might	take	ownership	of	implementing	that	committee’s	decision.	In	other	words,	
the	defamiliarization	of	the	world	that	occurs	in	existential	anxiety	provides	an	invitation	to	
me	to	take	ownership	of	my	life	and	the	ways	in	which	things	make	sense	to	me.	Rachael,	
having	experienced	such	anxiety,	ultimately	takes	that	invitation	to	authenticity	(to	own	her	
being),	as	we	discover	when	Deckard	returns	to	his	apartment	at	the	end	of	the	film	to	find	
her	waiting	for	him	and	ready	to	flee	with	him.	
	
Elsewhere	in	the	film,	the	issue	of	authenticity	is	approached	from	a	different	angle.	Just	
ahead	of	his	pre-programed	death,	the	Nexus	6	Roy	catches	the	hand	of	the	blade	runner	
Deckard	when	the	latter	falls	from	a	high	building.	Before	he	falls,	the	injured	Deckard	
endures	a	moment	of	hanging	by	his	fingertips	from	the	edge	of	the	building.	Given	
Deckard’s	helpless	and	fear-ridden	state,	and	given	Roy’s	impending	death,	one	might	have	
expected	Roy	to	have	taunted	Deckard	with	something	along	the	lines	of:	‘that’s	what	it	
feels	like	to	be	about	to	die’.	But	what	Roy	actually	says	is	this:	’that's	what	it	is	to	be	a	
slave’.	In	other	words,	Roy	points	out	that	living	in	fear	of	one’s	own	death	as	a	fixed	event	
is	to	live	inauthentically,	that	is,	without	genuine	ownership	or	control	of	one’s	existence,	a	
state	strikingly	mirrored	by	Deckard’s	helpless	dangling	over	the	edge	of	the	building.	Roy’s	
predicament	is	such	that	he	is	never	able	to	hear	the	call	of	authenticity.		
	
To	be	clear,	Bladerunner	works	by	blurring	human	and	replicant	being,	not	by	assimilating	
the	latter	to	the	former.	Thus	Rachael’s	existential	anxiety	is	driven	not	by	the	discovery	
that	she	has	a	heritage	that	she	hasn’t	ever	questioned,	as	might	be	the	case	for	a	human	
being	hearing	the	call	of	authenticity,	but	by	the	discovery	that	she	has	no	heritage.	And	
that	means	that,	strictly	speaking,	Rachael	cannot	be	Dasein,	because	she	fails	to	meet	a	
necessary	condition	for	realizing	that	way	of	being.	There	remains,	then,	a	distance	between	
the	replicants	and	us.	But,	in	the	moment	in	which	one	empathizes	with	Rachael’s	sense	of	
existential	homelessness,	or	indeed	with	Roy’s	sense	of	a	lack	of	ownership	of	his	life,	that	
distance	is	problematized	until	the	phrase	‘strictly	speaking’	can	sound	unbelievably	hollow.	
The	key	point	I	want	to	make	here,	however,	is	this:	the	search	for	overlaps	and	
disconnections	between	the	replicants	and	us	is	most	illuminatingly	conducted	not	at	the	
level	of	physical	or	biological	constitution,	nor	at	the	level	of	feelings	and	emotions	
considered	merely	as	experiences,	but,	as	Heidegger	would	have	it,	at	the	level	of	the	most	
fundamental	structures	that	determine	the	ways	in	which	lives	are	made	meaningful.	And	
that	explains	why	Bladerunner	engages	us,	challenges	us	and	touches	us.	
	
	
